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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-3203 
________________ 
 
BRIAN C. KASZUBA, 
                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF DICKSON CITY; MICHAEL FEDORKA;  
ROBERT HALL; ROSE LOURYK; RICK CESARI;  
JACK HORVATH; JEFFREY KOVALESKI; BARBARA MECCA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-16-cv-01239) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on June 13, 2019 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, KRAUSE and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 17, 2019) 
 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
                                                            
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Brian C. Kaszuba appeals the District Court’s order of summary 
judgment dismissing his First Amendment claims against the Borough of Dickson City 
and several of its council members for retaliation based on his speech and union 
association.  Because we agree with the District Court that Kaszuba has failed to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of those claims, we will affirm.   
I. Background 
 Kaszuba was hired by the Borough of Dickson City as an employee in its 
Department of Public Works (DPW) in 1992 and was a member and a union steward of 
the Teamsters Local 229 Union starting in 2003.1  He often expressed his political views 
by, e.g., displaying signs in his truck for Borough Council candidates that he supported.  
Beginning in early 2014, Kaszuba expressed his opinion of a new Borough construction 
project, known as New Borough Hall, by, inter alia, attending Borough Council Meetings 
and—as the Council eventually learned—posting his views on an anonymous Facebook 
page called “Dickson City Deception.” 
 Kaszuba’s employment record remained unblemished, however, until October 16, 
2014, when he learned that the Borough Manager, Ches Forconi, had advised Kaszuba’s 
supervisor that Kaszuba was not permitted to enter New Borough Hall except for 
“official business.”  Dkt. No. 23-3 ¶ 36.  When Kaszuba then confronted Forconi to 
determine whether he was being singled out for this prohibition, Forconi denied that he 
                                                            
 1 As a union steward, he investigated and filed grievances on behalf of fellow 
union members. 
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was and explained that a generally applicable written policy would soon be issued.  
Nonetheless, Kaszuba returned to see Forconi again that same day, this time escalating 
the encounter by raising his voice, swearing, and getting so close to Forconi that Forconi 
feared a physical altercation may ensue.  The incident prompted the Council President, 
Appellee Barbara Mecca, to contact the Borough Police Chief to conduct a criminal 
investigation, but charges were never filed against Kaszuba. 
 The next day, October 17, Forconi sent Kaszuba a letter advising him that he was 
being suspended and placed on paid administrative leave but also requiring him to 
“remain available to appear for employment interviews during normal working hours.”  
JA 9.  Kaszuba initially scheduled a meeting to discuss the incident with Mecca on 
October 21, but Mecca cancelled the meeting on October 20, which was the same day 
that Kaszuba revealed on Facebook that he was the creator of “Dickson City Deception.” 
 Although Forconi then attempted to schedule interviews with Kaszuba, Kaszuba 
declined to cooperate.  After Kaszuba failed to appear at the employment meeting 
scheduled on October 28, it was rescheduled for the morning of October 29.  When 
Kaszuba then failed to appear for that morning meeting, Forconi sent him another letter 
recommending a multi-day suspension and advising that if he failed to appear at the third 
meeting, scheduled for that afternoon, Forconi would recommend his termination.  When 
Kaszuba again failed to appear, Forconi sent him a third letter, explaining the reason for 
his recommendation of termination and inviting Kaszuba to offer “any and all 
information which would cause [Forconi] to reconsider taking disciplinary action . . . .”  
S.R. 225b.  Kaszuba declined that opportunity, and on November 12, Kaszuba was 
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advised that Forconi would be asking the Borough Council to vote for his termination at 
an upcoming Council Meeting.  The Council unanimously approved that 
recommendation.  
 Kaszuba then filed a complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting 
First Amendment retaliation claims against seven council members—Michael Fedorka, 
Robert Hall, Rose Louryk, Rick Cesari, Jack Horvath, Jeffrey Kovaleski, and Barbara 
Mecca—as well as a claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Security, 436 U.S. 
658 (1978), against the Borough.  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
Appellees’ favor on all claims, concluding that Kaszuba had failed to raise a triable issue 
because “[t]he overwhelming undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff repeatedly failed 
to comply with the Borough’s investigation regarding the October 16, 2014 incident,” 
and thus that Kaszuba’s “insubordination and his failure to report for his scheduled 
employee interviews were the reasons for his termination.”  Kaszuba v. Borough of 
Dickson City, No. 3:16-1239, 2018 WL 4492813, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2018).  
Kaszuba timely appealed.2 
                                                            
 2 Kaszuba waived his Monell claim on appeal by failing to raise it.  See Am. 
Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 455 (3d Cir. 
2018).  In any event, as we conclude that he has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a 
constitutional violation to survive summary judgment, a fortiori, he cannot demonstrate 
that any constitutional violation was authorized, sanctioned, or condoned on the part of 
the Borough or its officials.  See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 
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II. Discussion3 
 To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claims, Kaszuba was required to 
show that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity, and (2) that the activity 
“was a substantial or motivating factor” for Appellees’ adverse action.  Munroe v. Cent. 
Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 466 (3d Cir. 2015).4  If these two elements are satisfied, 
“the burden shifts to [Appellees] to show ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that [they] 
would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct.’”  Suppan 
v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).  To establish the requisite causal connection, 
Kaszuba must prove either: “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism 
coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  “In the absence of that proof the plaintiff must show 
that from ‘the evidence gleaned from the record as a whole’ the trier of the fact should 
                                                            
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo, Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2005), and we 
will affirm if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kaszuba as the non-moving 
party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the Appellees are “entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 
417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
 4 Appellees concede that “[f]or purposes of [their] Motion for Summary Judgment 
only, [they] . . . d[o] not dispute that [Kaszuba] engaged in protected activities[.]”  
Appellees’ Br. 20 n.4.  In light of that concession, and because this case can be resolved 
on causation, we need not consider whether Kaszuba’s activity was constitutionally 
protected in the context of a speech claim separate and apart from an association claim.  
Cf. Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 6 
  
infer causation.”  Id. (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d 
Cir. 2000)).   
 On appeal, Kaszuba raises two arguments as to causation, neither of which is 
persuasive.  First, he argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
temporal proximity between Appellees’ awareness as of October 20 that Kaszuba created 
the Facebook page “Dickson City Deception” and Appellee Mecca’s decision that same 
day to cancel a meeting with him is “unusually suggestive” of a retaliatory motive.  
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267.  However, as the District Court recognized, Appellees took 
adverse action against Kaszuba by placing him on administrative leave on October 17, 
before they learned of his Facebook activity.  Kaszuba, 2018 WL 4492813, at *9; 
see Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[F]or protected 
conduct to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision, the decisionmakers must be 
aware of the protected conduct.”).  Moreover, the fact that Appellees took no further 
adverse action until after Kaszuba’s intervening failure to attend the October 28 and 29 
meetings undermines any inference of a causal connection.  See Thomas v. Town of 
Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (temporal proximity between protected 
activity and adverse action negated where appellant’s “attendance record during the 
intervening three-week period” was “far more strongly suggest[ive]” of a non-retaliatory 
reason).   
 Second, Kaszuba contends that the District Court did not afford proper weight to 
the deposition testimony of four witnesses indicating “that they believed that the October 
16, 2014 incident . . . and the failures to appear at the requested subsequent interviews 
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were pretext for the actual reason for Kaszuba’s termination: his outspoken dissent of the 
government and its officials.”  Appellant’s Br. 12.  But as the District Court explained, all 
four witnesses failed to “cite to specific evidence” and, by their own admission, were 
expressing merely “opinions and beliefs.”  Kaszuba, 2018 WL 4492813, at *10.  Because 
“an inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual 
dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment,” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.3d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1990)), the District Court correctly discounted the deposition testimony and entered 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
